Abstract
Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis ( with fixed exchange rate raise the interest rate in order to control domestic inflation-a move that also increases the difference with world interest rate. Given arbitrage in open capital markets and the underlying interest rate parity condition, such a move will attract capital inflows into the domestic economy resulting in an appreciating pressure on the fixed exchange rate. Subsequent intervention in the foreign exchange market to buy international reserves and sell domestic currency in order to maintain the fixed exchange rate in the face of the appreciation pressure will end up defeating the original objective of controlling domestic inflation. Thus while the US is an example of an economy pursuing flexible exchange rates, open capital markets and independent monetary policy, countries belonging to the Euro zone follow a combination of exchange rate stability, financial integration and zero monetary independence (Aizenman, 2010) . In recent times, empirical estimation of the Trilemma has been popularized in the academic literature most notably by Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2005, 2010) and Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2008; 2010a, b; . Halfway into the current decade, India is experiencing several interesting phenomena in its macroeconomic environment. Its GDP growth rate is increasing once again after few years of slowdown in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis; its equity and debt markets continue to attract foreign capital inflows buoyed by the economy's revitalized growth prospects and improving macroeconomic scenario; it is on the verge of embarking on a 'glide-path' of inflation targeting following the release of the Urjit Patel Committee Report by the RBI in 2014, and finally, it continues to face growing currency volatility owing to a rapidly changing post-crisis global environment. In view of these, the question of where India stands with regard to the Trilemma becomes all the more pertinent now.
In this chapter, I present a comprehensive overview of a select few empirical papers that I have written with other co-authors, investigating the evolution of the Trilemma in India over the past couple of decades and analyzing the extent of tradeoffs faced by policy makers between financial integration, monetary autonomy and exchange rate stability. Based on these studies I attempt to analyze how have Indian policy makers dealt with the various trade-offs while managing the Trilemma over the last two decades and also draw relevant policy conclusions.
India post 1991 liberalization reforms
After the Balance of Payments crisis in 1991, a comprehensive series of liberalization, privatization and deregulation reforms were implemented in the banking sector, trade sector as well as financial markets in India, the net result being, over the next couple of decades the Indian economy witnessed several structural changes (Shah, 2008; Mohan and Kapur, 2009; Hutchison, Sengupta, Singh, 2011) . In what follows, I provide a brief account of the Indian economy with respect to the two main tenets of the Trilemma-capital account openness and exchange rate stability.
Capital Account Management
India's capital account liberalization that began in early 1990s has since then been a steady albeit slow and gradual process (Hutchison, Kendall, Pasricha and Singh, 2010; Sen Gupta and Sengupta, 2014) . As regards opening up the financial markets to foreign investment, Indian authorities have always proceeded with a lot of caution and apparent skepticism about the benefits of foreign capital balanced against the potential instability that such capital inflows might trigger. While on one hand foreign capital offers diversification opportunities to investors and provides avenues to bridge the gap between domestic saving and investment, on the other hand unbridled flows can fuel inflationary pressures, fan asset price bubbles, and sudden reversals in capital inflows can lead to instabilities and even crises in financial and currency markets. The decade of the 1990s was replete with several such incidents of financial crises all over the emerging world as seen in Mexico (1994 ), East Asia (1997 , Russia (1998 ), Brazil (1999 ) and eventually Argentina (2000 .
All these episodes of crises were triggered by rampant volatile debt inflows into the domestic economies. It is not surprising therefore that when its turn came after the crisis of 1991 India adopted a calibrated and hierarchical approach towards capital account liberalization, prioritizing some flows over others (Reddy, 2008) . With the memories of the emerging economy crises fresh in mind, India gradually opened up non-debt flows (FDI, and portfolio) more than debt flows. The pre-GFC surge episodes were primarily driven by bank and non-bank flows such as commercial borrowings by the Indian corporate sector, short-term trade credits and deposits by non-resident Indians as well as by portfolio equity flows. These inflows were encouraged by the widening interest rate differential between India and the advanced economies, greater liberalization of borrowing norms, improved domestic economy fundamentals and availability of abundant global liquidity. However, though in absolute terms India is now more open than it used to be during the early 1990s, the cautious and gradual approach towards capital account liberalization has meant that India has significantly lagged behind other countries irrespective of whether the capital account openness is measured using de-jure or de-facto indicators as shown by Sen Gupta and Sengupta (2013) . Even today, more than two decades after India started opening up its capital account, there exists an extensive array of restrictive controls imposed by authorities on different categories of foreign investment in order to actively manage the capital account.
Exchange rate management
India officially moved to a market based exchange rate system in 1993Q3. Empirical analysis of the data shows that the nominal exchange rate has gone through several structural breaks since then. Zeileis, Patnaik and Shah (2010) and Patnaik, Shah, Sethy and Balasubramaniam (2011) show that while the Rupee was closely pegged to the dollar till 1997, during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, there was a short period of flexibility when the Rupee depreciated significantly. 
Impossible Trinity or Trilemma
The pioneering work in empirically assessing Trilemma as mentioned earlier, has been done among others, by Ito (2010a, 2010b; 
Evolution of Trilemma in India
Among the few empirical studies that have explored the issue of Trilemma in the Indian context, Hutchison, Sengupta and Singh (2011) were perhaps one of the earliest. In fact, it was also the first paper that took the ACI panel-data approach in measuring the Trilemma and modified it suitably to estimate the Trilemma in a time-series framework for a single country. In their paper they attempted to answer the questions: To what extent has financial integration imposed greater constraints on exchange rate and interest rate policies in India? What has been the cost of international financial liberalization in terms of macroeconomic policy?
They address these questions by measuring the trade-off between capital account openness (KO), exchange rate stability (ERS) and monetary independence (MI) in India. They calculate a Trilemma index for India and investigate its evolution over time. They also assess the impact of the Trilemma configurations on major macroeconomic indicators for India.
They use quarterly data from 1996Q2 to 2009Q3 and therefore can exploit greater data variation unlike ACI who had used annual data. They also divide the entire sample period into three equal segments to better study the evolution of Trilemma over time. They measure MI as the reciprocal of the correlation between interest rates in the home country (here India) and the base country (here the United States). They calculate quarterly correlations using weekly interest rate data on 90-day government securities. More precisely, MI is measured as:
( 1) This index can theoretically take any value ranging from 0 to 1 with a higher value indicating greater degree of monetary independence. The authors measure ERS using quarterly standard deviations of the change in the log of Rupee-Dollar exchange rate and construct the index based on the following formula:
Appropriate scaling ensures that the index lies between 0 and 1, with the highest value indicating the greatest degree of exchange rate stability.
Finally, to measure financial integration Hutchison et al (2011) deviate significantly from ACI who use the de-jure Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito, 2008) , which for India exhibits little or no variation over time and hence might not be a suitable measure of capital account openness in the context of the Trilemma. Hutchison et al (2011) use a de-facto measure of capital account openness based on the ratio of the sum of inward and outward foreign investment flows to GDP (Lane and Milessi-Ferreti, 2007) . Moreover, they use gross instead of net capital flows, in order to be able to distinguish between negligible flows and large flows. As pointed out succinctly by Sen Gupta and Sengupta (2013, 2014) as well, a country with high de jure openness can have low capital flows owing to limited opportunities for economic returns and hence be able to simultaneously stabilize exchange rate and retain monetary autonomy. Alternatively, a country with low de jure openness can experience large flows owing to low enforcement of capital controls, and face a trade-off between ensuring MI and ERS. The evolution of the three Trilemma indices during the sample period considered by Hutchison et al (2011) is presented in the three panels in Figure 1 .
Figure 1a: Monetary Independence Index
As mentioned before, an important contribution of ACI is connecting international reserves with the three Trilemma policy variables, the general idea being that reserve accumulation gives policymakers more flexibility in dealing with the short-run trade-offs between MI and ERS, for a given level of financial integration. Like other emerging economies, this is highly pertinent for India as well given the remarkable pace of reserve hoarding that the RBI has been undertaking especially since the early 2000s. In this context, Hutchison et al (2011) demonstrate the evolution of the Trilemma policy variables as well as of the reserves-GDP ratio for India over the three windows spanning across their sample period, using the classic diamond graph popularized by ACI. In the diamond graph the authors plot the averages of each of three Trilemma indices along with the reserves-GDP ratio for each sub-period. The diamond graph for India as seen in Figure 2 shows that the Indian economy increased its ratio of reserves to GDP along with greater financial integration, as it tried to balance MI and ERS. India, like other emerging economies, has been balancing all three policy objectives and attaining a somewhat middle-ground perhaps through changes in its reserves stock, achieving comparable levels of ERS and financial integration. The authors find that ERS and financial integration were given marginally more importance followed by MI. In their rigorous econometric analysis, all three policy objectives come out statistically significant for India with relatively higher weight being placed on the ERS index, thereby echoing the findings of Hutchison et al (2011) . Overtime the Trilemma configuration that has evolved in India is one of greater exchange rate stability and financial integration, combined with an attempt to retain monetary autonomy through active intervention in foreign exchange markets.
Finally, in their recent work Sen Gupta and Sengupta (2013, 2014) for ERS they use a different methodology introduced by Frankel and Wei (1994) . In their method, the degree of influence of major global currencies on the Indian Rupee can be estimated using the following model:
Here, is the exchange rate of currency i against a numèraire currency, for which the authors use the Swiss franc and currency i can be the US Dollar, Japanese Yen and the Euro. If the Rupee is pegged to an individual or a basket of currencies the model will give a higher goodness of fit or R 2 . Accordingly, the authors estimate this model for each quarter using daily data and take the adjusted R 2 as a measure of ERS, with a higher R 2 indicating greater pegging to an individual or a basket of currencies. The evolution of this ERS series for the sample period considered by the authors is shown in Figure 3 . 
Concluding remarks
The rise in the volatility of global capital flows has made macroeconomic management increasingly complex especially for emerging economies that are striving to achieve a balance between the diverse objectives of robust growth rate, sustainable current account deficit, competitive exchange rate, access to adequate external capital for financing investment, moderate inflation, and sufficient international reserves. This has also reignited the debate on suitable macroeconomic management measures. One of the main challenges that emerging economies face today as they integrate with global capital markets is managing the trade-offs presented by the well known Impossible Trinity or open economy Trilemma and in this, India is no exception.
The results of the few select empirical studies that have attempted to quantify the various policy objectives under the Trilemma in India summarized here seem to be overall consistent with those found for a broader group of emerging economies. Among this group the policy combination of exchange rate stability and financial openness has been the most dominant over the past two decades.
India seems to have actively managed its exchange rate, building up a high level of international reserves by intervening heavily in the foreign exchange market and has also managed to retain some control over domestic monetary policy. In fact, active intervention in foreign exchange market coupled with maintaining a reasonable degree of control over international capital flows seem to have emerged as a potent combination of policy instruments in India as it strives to manage the macroeconomic Trilemma. These issues are likely to be highly relevant in the current context in India as policy makers actively engage in inflation targeting to control domestic inflationary pressures, the Rupee exhibits renewed volatility in the face of foreign investment inflows and India strives to revive its erstwhile high growth rate.
